

blockade measures; 5) warlike propaganda and threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of Israel; and 6) refusal of Egypt to seek agreement by negotiations for an effective transition from the present armistice to peace. (U.N. doc. S/3368)

On March 4, the Security Council, at its 692d meeting, placed the Egyptian and Israeli complaints on its agenda and then adjourned consideration of the matter until it had received the report of Major General E.L.M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 692) Meeting again on March 17, the Security Council considered the Chief of Staff's report. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 693) In this document, Burns informed the Security Council that on March 6, the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had found Israel responsible for the attack at Gaza and had decided that it was a violation of the General Armistice Agreement. Reviewing the situation along the armistice demarcation line, the Chief of Staff said that the number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident reflected the comparative tranquillity which had prevailed in the area during the greater part of the period from November 1954 to February 1955. However, repeated minor incidents had helped to create a state of tension of which one of the main causes, though not the only cause, had undoubtedly been infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory. In order to decrease the tension along the demarcation line, General Burns suggested that the two parties should examine in an informal manner the possibility of agreeing on certain measures: 1) institution of joint patrols along sensitive sections of the demarcation line; 2) negotiation of a local commanders' agreement; 3) erection of a barbed wire obstacle along certain portions of the demarcation line; and 4) manning of all outposts and patrols by regular Egyptian and Israeli soldiers. In conclusion, the Chief of Staff said that he was of the opinion that, if an agreement were effected along the lines he had suggested, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance—"a kind of thieving which Israel must probably regard as inevitable"—as long as there were large numbers of poverty-stricken refugees on its border. (U.N. doc. S/3373)

On March 28, the Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted to the Security Council two draft resolutions referring respectively to the Gaza incident and to general conditions along the armistice demarcation line. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 694) On March 29, the Council unanimously adopted the first resolution. (U.N. doc. S/PV. 695) In this document, the Security Council noted that the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had determined that Israeli authorities had prearranged and planned an attack by Israeli regular army forces against Egyptian army forces in the Gaza Strip on February 28, condemned that attack, and called